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THE GOLDEN NUMBER AND FIBONACCI SEQUENCES IN
THE DESIGN OF VOTING STRUCTURES
JOSEP FREIXAS AND SASCHA KURZ
Abstract. Some distinguished types of voters, as vetoers, passers or nulls, as
well as some others, play a significant role in voting systems because they are
either the most powerful or the least powerful voters in the game independently
of the measure used to evaluate power. In this paper we are concerned with
the design of voting systems with at least one type of these extreme voters and
with few types of equivalent voters, with this purpose in mind we enumerate
these special classes of games and find out that its number always follows a
Fibonacci sequence with smooth polynomial variations. As a consequence we
find several families of games with the same asymptotic exponential behavior
excepting of a multiplicative factor which is the golden number or its square.
From a more general point of view, our studies are related with the design of
voting structures with a predetermined importance ranking.
Keywords: Game Theory, Voting systems, Complete Simple Games, Enu-
meration and Classification, Operational Research Structures
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1. Introduction
Determining importance rankings is a significant issue in operational research.
The structures which are the target of our study completely rank the items (voters
or components, see e.g. [17]) from the most important to the least important ac-
cording to a well-known influence relation, so that we have a hierarchy for the items.
This total ranking for these structures implies also the same ranking for the most
well-known measures of importance [10], [12] and [27] so that it is unchallengeable.
In order to design structures or mechanisms for a given hierarchy we need to
count all the possibilities available for it. The main purpose of this paper is enu-
merating these versatile structures commonly used in Operations Research. Indeed,
the study of ordinal preferences involves a variety of fields, including tournament
theory, multiple criteria decision modeling (MCDM), and, more recently, data en-
velopment analysis of qualitative data. As stated in the survey by Cook in [8], the
notion of voter power or relative importance has been largely ignored in studies
on ordinal ranking problems, although if a tangible estimate of voter importance
exists, then these voters can be treated like criteria in an MCDM problem. In
fact, if a common ranking exists for the most well-known power indices, this would
definitively demonstrate a given importance ordering. This approach is thus useful
in designing structures ranking voters in voting institutions, workers in manage-
ment enterprises or device components. Examples in these different contexts can
be found in: [1, 24, 29, 32, 36].
Besides this more general motivation for our studies, the paper contributes to
the classification of simple games or more generally voting systems initiated in the
1
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classical monograph [31] by von Neumann and Morgenstern. Here we enumerate
some classes of complete simple games, i.e. special classes of voting systems in which
each player casts a “yes” or a “no” vote, and the outcome is a collective “yes” or
“no” decision, with distinguished types of voters. We address our attention to
complete simple games with at least one of the six types of voters: dictators, veto
players, passers, null players, semi-veto players, or semi-passers, see Section 2 for the
precise definitions. As far as we know the two last types have not been considered
before in voting literature.
1.1. Related work. One of the first and most prominent enumeration results on
simple games, a super class of complete simple games, is May’s Theorem for Simple
Games [30] stating that the number of simple games with n voters for simple
majority decisions equals one1. If only anonymous or symmetric (i.e. any pair of
voters are substitutes) voters are considered for simple games with n voters we get
SG(n, 1) = CG(n, 1) =WG(n, 1) = n.
Here SG(n, t) denotes the number of simple games, CG(n, t) the number of com-
plete simple games, and WG(n, t) the number of weighted voting games with n
voters from t different types of equivalent voters.
The number CG(n, 2) of complete simple games with n voters belonging to
exactly two types of voters were recently enumerated in [14] and later on in [26],
giving a simpler proof:
(1) CG(n, 2) = F (n+ 6)− (n2 + 4n+ 8) ∈ Θ
((
1 +
√
5
2
)n)
,
where F (n) are the Fibonacci numbers which constitute a well–known sequence of
integer numbers defined by the following recurrence relation: F (0) = 0, F (1) = 1,
and F (n) = F (n− 1) + F (n− 2) for all n > 1.
The number of complete simple games with one shift-minimal winning coalition,
see e.g. [7, 19], was determined in [16]:
∑n
t=1 CG(n, t, 1) = 2
n−1, where CG(n, t, r)
denotes the number of complete simple games with n voters, t equivalent types of
voters, and r shift-minimal winning coalitions. For complete simple games with
two shift-minimal winning coalitions a more complicated enumeration formula was
determined in [26]. For given values of the parameters t and r it is possible to
compute an exact enumeration formula for CG(n, t, r) based on the parametric
Barvinok algorithm and a tailored decomposition of a certain linear programming
formulation for complete simple games, see [26]. We remark that the exact numbers
of simple games are known up to n = 8 voters and the exact number of complete
simple games or weighted voting games are known up to n = 9 voters.
The structures under study, complete simple games, have interest in several
different fields apart from voting although we adopt in this paper the standard
voting background. Fields for which these structures are of interest are: circuits,
clusters, threshold logic, cryptography, reliability or neural networks among others,
see e.g. [40] for an overview. Recently simple games were studied using binary
decision diagrams, see e.g. [3, 4].
1May originally considered a slightly different setting of anonymous voting systems for two
alternatives that are neutral, i.e. there is no built-in bias towards “yes” or “no” outcomes.
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Special types of voters in simple games were also considered in [33]. Complexity
results for identifying some of the proposed distinguished types of voters can be
found in [2].
1.2. Our contribution. We establish bijections among several classes of complete
simple games containing at least one of the mentioned distinguished types of play-
ers, and obtain exact enumerations for these games with less than four types of
equivalent voters and for four types whenever null voters are present with either
veto players or passers. While these enumerations are polynomial for only two types
of voters, they follow a Fibonacci sequence modified by a polynomial expression.
So Fibonacci sequences and the golden number are in the core of these enumera-
tions. The obtained sequences in this paper have not yet appeared in the On-line
Encyclopedia of Integer Sequences (http://oeis.org/).
1.3. Organization of the paper. In Section 2 we briefly recall some necessary
background on simple games, complete simple games, i.e. the examined voting
systems, and some types of players. To get the results in the present paper we will
make use of one additional previous result, besides the enumeration of CG(n, 2),
namely a parametrization for complete simple games given in [7], which we will
restate in Subsection 2.1. In Section 3 we prove that four classes of complete simple
games with voters being very powerful or being nulls have all the same cardinality,
additionally a closed formula on the number of voters is given for the number of
these games as long as the number of types of voters is less than 4. The main
tool to that end is Theorem 11 stating bijections between complete simple games
containing at least one of the distinguished types of voters. In Section 4 we consider
the case of complete simple games containing at least two of the distinguished types
of voters. Finally, we end with a conclusion and some remarks on future research
in Section 6.
2. Technical Background
In this section we briefly state the basic definitions of the examined voting sys-
tems. For more background material we refer to [40].
One of the most general class of voting systems, in which a single alternative,
such as a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo, is given by the
class of so-called simple games.
Definition 1. A simple game is a pair (N,W ) in which N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and W
is a collection of subsets of N that satisfies: N ∈W , ∅ /∈W and, the monotonicity
property, if S ∈W and S ⊆ T ⊆ N then T ∈W .
Any set of voters or players is called a coalition, and the set N is called the grand
coalition. Members of N are called players or voters, and the subsets of N that are
in W are called winning coalitions. The subfamily of minimal winning coalitions
Wm = {S ∈ W : T ⊂ S ⇒ T /∈ W} determines the game. The subsets of N that
are in 2N \W are called losing coalitions. Real–world examples of simple games
are given in [29, 38, 40] among others.
Example 2. For n = 3 we choose W =
{
{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 2, 3}
}
, i.e. the set of
winning coalitions, and N = {1, 2, 3} so that the set of minimal winning coalitions
is given by Wm =
{
{1, 2}, {1, 3}
}
.
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The monotonicity property of simple games is some kind of a universal base
assumption for voting systems. Most of the systems used in practice satisfy ad-
ditional requirements. One common idea is the concept of influence, i.e. that a
particular voting system may give one voter more influence than another. The so-
called “desirability” relation defined on the set of voters represents a way to make
this precise. Isbell already used it in [23].
Definition 3. Let (N,W ) be a simple game.
(i) Player i is at least as desirable as j (i % j, in short) in (N,W ) if
S ∪ {j} ∈W ⇒ S ∪ {i} ∈ W, for all S ⊆ N \ {i, j}.
(ii) Players i and j are equally desirable (i ≈ j, in short) in (N,W ) if
S ∪ {i} ∈W ⇔ S ∪ {j} ∈W, for all S ⊆ N \ {i, j}.
(iii) Player i is strictly more desirable than player j (i ≻ j, in short) in (N,W )
if i is at least as desirable as j, but i and j are not equally desirable.
In Example 2 players 2 and 3 are equally desirable, while player 1 is strictly
more desirable than player 2 and 3. The ≈-relation partitions the set of voters into
equivalence classes Ni. We say that two voters in the same equivalence class have
the same influence and belong to the same type (of voters). We also speak of the
number of types of voters meaning the number of equivalence classes. W.l.o.g. we
assume 1 % · · · % n in the following, i.e. completeness of the desirability relation
on (N,W ).
Definition 4. A simple game (N,W ) is complete or linear if the desirability re-
lation is a complete preordering.
A system to amend the Canadian Constitution used in the sixties and studied
in Kilgour [25] is an example of a complete simple game with two types of voters.
While most of the common voting systems consist of many types of voters, examples
with only few types of voters are not that artificial as one might think at the first
moment. As the structural properties of voting systems with few types of voters
seem to be more accessible, they are also a good starting point for theoretical
considerations. The enumeration of such voting structures is indeed the target of
our study. In the field of Boolean algebra, complete simple games correspond to
2-monotonic positive Boolean functions, which were already considered in [22]. The
problem of identifying this type of functions by using polynomial-time recognition
has been treated in [5, 6].
We introduce some distinguished types of voters for simple games.
Definition 5. Let (N,W ) be a simple game.
i) i ∈ N is a dictator in (N,W ) if Wm = {{i}},
ii) i ∈ N has veto in (N,W ) if i ∈ S for all S ∈ W ,
iii) i ∈ N is a passer in (N,W ) if {i} ∈ W ,
iv) i ∈ N is null in (N,W ) if i /∈ S for all S ∈Wm.
v) i ∈ N has semi-veto in (N,W ) if i ∈ S for all S ∈ W with the only
exception of coalition N \ {i} which is also a winning coalition.
vi) i ∈ N is a semi-passer in (N,W ) if {i, j} ∈ W for all j ∈ N \ {i}, but
{i} /∈W .
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A typical example of an important complete voting system with vetoers is the
United Nations Security Council. The voters in this system are the fifteen countries
that make up the Security Council, five of which are permanent members whereas
the other ten are non-permanent members. Passage requires a total of at least nine
of the fifteen possible votes, subject to a veto due to a nay vote from any one of
the five permanent members. This model ignores abstention. For a treatment of
this example considering the possibility of abstention we refer the reader to [18].
In the former USSR the three top state officials, the President, the Prime min-
ister, and the Minister of Defence (Ustinov, Brezhnev, Kosygin), all had “nuclear
suitcases”. Any two of them could authorize a launch of a nuclear warhead. No one
could do it alone.2 This situation can be modeled as a complete simple game where
the set of minimal winning coalitions is given by Wm =
{{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}}.
Here all three players are both semi-vetoers and semi-passers.
A real-world example containing a null voter is given by the early European Eco-
nomic Community between 1958 and 1973. The six founders were West Germany,
France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. At that time the voting
procedure could be represented as the weighted voting game [12; 4, 4, 4, 2, 2, 1], see
the explanation for this notation at the end of this section. One can easily check
that Luxembourg is a null voter in this complete simple game. See e.g. [28] for
analyses of all EU councils of ministers.
For further considerations on real-world voting systems we refer the interested
reader e.g. to [9, 38, 40].
If a game has a dictator, the dictator is the unique player with this status and
the remaining players are null voters. Being a dictator is the most radical form
of having veto and of being a passer. A player can have veto and be a passer if
and only if the game is the dictatorship of this player. Thus, veto and passers
are pairwise incompatible in the same game if this is not the dictatorship of a
voter. If some of these types of voters are present in the game, then they form an
equivalence class N1 whose members dominate by the desirability relation all the
other elements in N . On the other hand, it is obvious that if n = 1 there cannot
be null voters; if n > 1 and the game has null voters they form an equivalence class
Nt whose members are dominated by the desirability relation for any other player
in N .
It is also obvious from the previous definition that veto and semi-veto (or passer
and semi-passer) voters can concur in the same game, while veto and semi-passer
or passer and semi-veto cannot concur in the same game (if we assume that their
roles are taken by different players). Semi-vetoers belong to the same equivalence
class N1 which is the strongest one by the desirability relation if the game has no
veto players, while they belong to the second class N2 if the game has veto players,
and similarly for semi-passers and passers. Finally, the concurrence of semi-vetoers
and nulls in the same game, and similarly, the concurrence of semi-passers and nulls
in the same game is not possible.
In summary, if a game has either a dictator, veto players or passers they are
the strongest players in the game and belong to the most powerful class; if a game
has null voters they are the weakest players in the game and belong to the least
2Example taken from the presentation “Secret sharing schemes and complete simple games”
by Arkadii Slinko.
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powerful class of the game.3 If a game has veto and semi-veto players or passers
and semi-passers, the semi-veto and semi-passers are the second strongest players
in the game, while in the absence of veto and passers they are respectively the most
strongest players in the game.
Definition 6. The dual game (N,W ∗) of a simple game (N,W ) is defined by
W ∗ = {S ⊆ N : N \ S /∈ W}.
Hence, to win in the dual game is to block in the original one (S is blocking in
(N,W ) if N \S /∈W ). It is easy to verify that: (W ∗)∗ =W , %∗ = % thus ≈∗ = ≈,
and a game is complete if and only if the dual is.
From the definition of dual game, it easily follows that:
(1) If (N,W ) is the dictatorship of player i, then (N,W ) = (N,W ∗);
(2) Voter i ∈ N has veto in (N,W ) if and only if voter i ∈ N is a passer in
(N,W ∗);
(3) Voter i ∈ N is null in (N,W ) if and only if voter i ∈ N is null in (N,W ∗).
(4) Voter i ∈ N has semi-veto in (N,W ) if and only if voter i ∈ N is a
semi-passer in (N,W ∗).
As a last refinement of voting systems we want to mention weighted voting
games, which are a subclass of complete simple games. Here we assume that the
voting system can be represented by n+ 1 non-negative real numbers – a quota q
and weights wi for the players. As short-hand notation we use [q;w1, . . . , wn]. A
coalition S is winning if and only if
∑
i∈S wi ≥ q. The voting system from Exam-
ple 2 is weighted and a possible realization is given by [3; 2, 1, 1]. We remark that we
have wi > wj if i ≻ j, but not necessarily wi = wj if i ≈ j for two voters i, j ∈ N .
Note that [51; 50, 49, 1] is another realization for Example 2 demonstrating the last
property. However, as wi ≥ wj implies i  j, independently of the representation
used for the weighted game, we can conclude that all weighted voting games are
complete simple games. For more than 5 voters one may easily find examples of
complete simple games not being weighted. Many of the real-world voting systems
are weighted voting games (or can at least be represented as the intersection of a
small number of weighted voting games). We remark that every complete simple
game is the intersection of a finite number, the minimal number is called its di-
mension, of weighted voting games, see [40] and [15] for results on the dimension
of complete simple games with one shift-minimal winning coalition.
2.1. Characteristic invariants of complete simple games. In order to have a
more compact notation for the set of winning coalitions of a complete simple game
we introduce models of coalitions, so-called profiles. The notion is essential for our
enumerations later on.
Now we are going to define the δ-ordering, introduced in [7] for an arbitrary
number of types of voters t, for this particular case which will be useful to present
Theorem 9 below.
Definition 7. Let n be the number of players of a complete simple game (N,W )
with a given number of equivalence classes of voters t, N1 > · · · > Nt, let ni = |Ni|
3Almost all power indices respect the desirability relation, e.g. the Shapley-Shubik, Banzhaf
or Johnston indices [10], [12], and [27]. Thus belonging to the strongest class in the game means
being one of the most powerful players, and belonging to the weakest class in the game means
being one of the least powerful players in the game.
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for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t, then (n1, . . . , nt) ∈ Nt = N× · · · × N︸ ︷︷ ︸
t
with
∑t
i=1 ni = n, the
box (or hyper-rectangle) of
∏t
i=1(ni + 1) profiles for (N,W ) is: In1 × · · · × Int =
{(m1, . . . ,mt) ∈ (N ∪ {0})t : m1 ≤ n1, . . . ,mt ≤ nt}. Let m = (m1, . . . ,mt) ∈
In1×· · ·×Int , the δ-ordering given by the comparison of partial sums in In1×· · ·×Int
is:
p δ m if and only if
k∑
i=1
pi ≥
k∑
i=1
mi for all 1 ≤ k ≤ t.
It is not difficult to check that the couple (In1×· · ·×Int , δ) is a distributive lattice
that possesses a maximum element n = (n1, . . . , nt), and a minimum element,
0 = (0, . . . , 0). The profiles in In1 × · · · × Int can be completely ordered by the
lexicographical ordering; profile p is lexicographically greater than m if p δ m.
In Example 2 we have t = 2, N1 = {1}, N2 = {2, 3}, n1 = 1, and n2 = 2. With
this the model (1, 1) represents the coalitions {1, 2} and {1, 3}. A more extensive
example is outlined later on.
The big utility of the profiles and the δ-ordering is its compatibility with the
property of being a winning coalition. To be more precise, for a given profile p all
corresponding coalitions are either winning or losing. So we also speak of winning
or losing profiles. Moreover, for two profiles with p δ m and m winning, we have
that p must be winning. This permits to describe the set of winning profiles using
the set of winning profiles, which are minimal in the δ-ordering, only.
Definition 8. Two simple games (N,W ) and (N ′,W ′) are said to be isomorphic
if there is a bijective map f : N → N ′ such that S ∈ W if and only if f(S) ∈ W ′;
f is called an isomorphism of simple games.
In the following we restate a known parametrization result of complete simple
games up to isomorphism, which has three parts. The first part shows how to asso-
ciate a vector n and a matrix M to a complete simple game (N,W ) and describes
the restrictions that these parameters need to fulfill. The second part establishes
that isomorphic complete simple games (N,W ) and (N ′,W ′) correspond to the
same associated vector n and matrixM (uniqueness). The third part shows that a
vector n and a matrix M fulfilling the conditions in Part A correspond to a com-
plete simple game (N,W ) (existence). We also assume in what follows that the
rows (if r ≥ 2) of M are lexicographically ordered by partial sums, i.e. if p < q,
then there exists some minimum element k (1 ≤ k ≤ t− 1) such that mp,k > mq,k
and mp,i = mq,i for all i < k.
Theorem 9. (Carreras and Freixas’ Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 in [7])
Part A: Let (N,W ) be a complete simple game with t nonempty equivalence
classes of voters N1 > · · · > Nt, let (n1, . . . , nt) be the vector defined by
their cardinalities. For each coalition S ∈W we consider the node or profile
(s1, . . . , st) ∈ In1 × · · · × Int with components sk = |S ∩Nk| (k = 1, . . . , t),
and let M be the matrix
M =

 m1,1 m1,2 . . . m1,t... ... . . . ...
mr,1 mr,2 . . . mr,t


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with m1,1 > 0 whose r rows are the nodes corresponding to winning profiles
which are minimal in the δ-ordering, let mp = (mp,1, . . . ,mp,t) be the pth
row of M. Matrix M satisfies the four conditions below:
(1) nk > 0 for all k = 1, . . . , t;
(2) 0 ≤ mp ≤ n for p = 1, . . . , r;
(3) mp and mq are not δ-comparable for all p 6= q; and
(4) if t > 1 then for every k < t there exists some p such that4
mp,k > 0, mp,k+1 < nk+1.
Part B: (Uniqueness) Two complete simple games with two classes of voters
(N,W ) and (N ′,W ′) are isomorphic if and only if (n1, n2) = (n′1, n′2) and
M =M′.
Part C: (Existence) Given a vector (n1, n2) and a matrix M satisfying the
conditions of Part A, there exists a complete simple game (N,W ) with two
classes of voters associated to vector (n1, n2) and matrix M.
To illustrate how (N,W ) is obtained from the pair ((n1, n2),M) we consider the
following example:
Example 10. Let (n1, n2) = (2, 3) and M =
(
2 0
0 3
)
.
The set of winning profiles in In1 × In2 is
{(0, 3), (1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 0), (2, 1), (2, 2), (2, 3)}
because each of these profiles either δ-dominates (2, 0) or (0, 3); and the set of
minimal winning profiles is {(0, 3), (1, 2), (2, 0)} because the other winning profiles
can be obtained from one of these three profiles by simply adding some elements
in one or two components. Those winning profiles, which are minimal in the δ-
ordering, are called shift-minimal winning coalitions. Here the set of shift-minimal
winning coalitions is given by {(0, 3), (2, 0)}, e.g. (1, 2) δ-dominates (0, 3) since
the later one arises from a right-shift of one voter. If we take N1 = {1, 2} and
N2 = {3, 4, 5} then N = N1 ∪N2 and
Wm =
{{1, 2}, {1, 3, 4}, {1, 3, 5}, {1, 4, 5}, {2, 3, 4}, {2, 3, 5}, {2, 4, 5}, {3, 4, 5}},
where the first coalition corresponds to profile (2, 0), the last coalition to profile
(0, 3) and the remaining intermingle coalitions to profile (1, 2). We remark that
stated example is weighted with representation [6; 3, 3, 2, 2, 2].
As abbreviation we use the notation p  q if profile p δ-dominates profile q. If
neither p  q nor q  p, i.e. if profiles p and q are not δ-comparable, we write p ⊲⊳ q.
Theorem 9 is a parametrization theorem because it allows one to enumerate all
complete simple games up to isomorphism by listing the possible values of certain
invariants. Based on this it is possible to compute an explicit enumeration formula
for the number of complete simple games with n voters if the parameters t and
r, i.e. the number of columns and rows of M, are specified (but arbitrary), see
[26]. This paper goes more deeply into the issue of enumerations for special cases
without assuming information on r.
An interest of complete simple games has emerged recently in the field of Cryp-
tography. Indeed, the access structure in a secret sharing (see e.g., Stinson [35]) can
4The lexicographic ordering chosen guarantees uniqueness under permutation of rows. This
lexicographic ordering is a plausible election which could be replaced for other alternative criteria.
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also be modeled by a simple game. To this end Simmons [34] introduced the con-
cept of a hierarchical access structure. Gvozdeva et al. [19] study complete simple
games with one-shift minimal winning vector (i.e. with a unique row for matrixM)
and observe that they are isomorphic concepts to conjunctive and disjunctive (for
the dual game) hierarchically access structures. Moreover, both conjunctive and
disjunctive hierarchically access structures have been proved to be ideal (Tassa [37])
which means they can carry secure (i.e., not giving any information about the secret
to unauthorized coalitions).
If a complete simple game has special types of voters then the characteristic
invariants, (n,M), that define it (and therefore fulfill the properties in Theorem 9-
(A)) have specific forms. In the next lemma, which will be intensively used in the
following section, we consider the specific form of the characteristic invariants for
complete simple games containing voters as defined in Definition 5.
Lemma 1. Let (n,M) be a complete simple game with at least two voters and
vector n = (n1, n2, . . . , nt) for some t ≥ 1 and
t∑
i=1
ni = n:
i) If the game has a dictator then t = 2, n = (1, n− 1) and M = (1 0) .
ii) If the game has k veto players then k = n1 and matrix M has the form:
M = (n) if t = 1, M = (n1 a) with a < n2 if t = 2, and
(2) M =


n1 m1,2 . . . m1,t
n1 m2,2 . . . m2,t
...
...
. . .
...
n1 mr,2 . . . mr,t


with m1,2 > 0 if t > 2.
iii) If the game has k passers then k = n1 and matrixM has the form: M = (1)
if t = 1,
M =
(
1 0
0 b
)
with n2 > 1 and b > 1 if t = 2, and
(3) M =


1 0 . . . 0
0 m2,2 . . . m2,t
...
...
. . .
...
0 mr,2 . . . mr,t


with m2,2 > 0 if t > 2.
iv) If the game has k null voters then t > 1, k = nt and matrix M has the
form:
M =


m1,1 m1,2 . . . m1,t−1 0
m2,1 m2,2 . . . m2,t−1 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
mr,1 mr,2 . . . mr,t−1 0


v) If the game has k1 vetoers and k2 semi-vetoers then k1 = n1, k2 = n2 and
matrix M has the form: M = (n1 n2 − 1) if t = 2, the form
M =
(
n1 n2 c
n1 n2 − 1 n3
)
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with n3 > 1 and c < n3 − 1 if t = 3, and the form
M =


n1 n2 m1,3 . . . m1,t−1 m1,t
n1 n2 m2,3 . . . m2,t−1 m2,t
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
n1 n2 mr−1,3 . . . mr−1,t−1 mr−1,t
n1 n2 − 1 n3 . . . nt−1 nt


if t > 3.
If the game has no vetoers but k semi-vetoers then k = n1 and matrix
M has the form: M = (n− 1) if t = 1,
M =
(
n1 a
n1 − 1 n2
)
with n2 > 1 and a < n2 − 1 if t = 2, and the form
M =


n1 m1,2 . . . m1,t
n1 m2,2 . . . m2,t
...
...
. . .
...
n1 mr−1,2 . . . mr−1,t
n1 − 1 n2 · · · nt


if t > 2.
vi) If the game has k1 passers and k2 semi-passers then k1 = n1, k2 = n2 and
matrix M has the form:
M = ( 1 0 )
if t = 2 and n2 = 1 or
M =
(
1 0
0 2
)
if t = 2 and n2 > 1,
M =

 1 0 00 1 1
0 0 b


with b > 2 and n3 > 2 if t = 3 or
M =
(
1 0 0
0 1 1
)
with n3 ≥ 2 if t = 3, and
M =


1 0 0 . . . 0 0
0 1 0 . . . 0 1
0 0 m3,3 . . . m3,t−1 m3,t
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 mr,3 . . . mr,t−1 mr,t


if t > 3.
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case contained type # games # games with t types
i dictator CGD(n) CGD(n, t)
ii vetoer CGV (n) CGV (n, t)
iii passer CGP (n) CGP (n, t)
iv null CGN(n) CGN(n, t)
v semi-veto CGSV (n) CGSV (n, t)
vi semi-passer CGSP (n) CGSP (n, t)
Table 1. Number of complete simple games with one distin-
guished type of voters.
If the game has no passers but k semi-passers then k = n1 and matrix
M has the form: M = (2) if t = 1,(
1 1
0 c
)
with n2 > 2 and c ≥ 3 if t = 2, and the form

1 0 . . . 0 1
0 m2,2 . . . m2,t−1 m2,t
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 mr,2 · · · mr,t−1 mr,t


if t > 2.
3. Enumerations for complete simple games with either the most
powerful voters or the least powerful – one distinguished type
of voters
In Definition 5 we have exposed six distinguished types of voters. In this sec-
tion we will consider complete simple games containing at least one of those six
special types of voters. To this end we introduce some notation in Table 1. So
CGV (n) e.g. represents the number of complete simple games having vetoers with
n voters. If the number of different types additionally is restricted we denote the
corresponding number by CGV (n, t). If we want to address the respective set of
objects instead of their number we use the corresponding curly literals, i.e. CGD(n)
CGV(n), CGP(n), CGN (n) CGSV(n), CGSP(n) and CGD(n, t) CGV(n, t), CGP(n, t),
CGN (n, t) CGSV(n, t), CGSP(n, t).
The condition that a complete simple game contains a dictator is very restrictive.
Due to our assumption on the ordering of the players, the first player is a dictator
and the set of minimal winning coalitions is given by Wm =
{{1}}. All other
players then have to be null voters. Thus we have t = 2, n1 = 1, n2 = n − 1 and
M = ( 1 0 ) unless n = 1.
Lemma 2. CGD(n) = 1 for n ≥ 1 and GCD(n, t) =


1 if t = 1, n = 1,
1 if t = 2, n ≥ 2,
0 otherwise.
The remaining five classes of complete simple games with one of the distin-
guished types of voters are pairwise in one–to–one correspondence and therefore
their cardinalities coincide.
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Theorem 11. For all positive integers n and t there is a bijection among the sets
of complete simple games:
CGV(n, t), CGP(n, t), CGSV(n, t), CGSP(n, t)
and for all positive integers n and t > 1 there is a bijection between any of these
four classes of games and CGN (n, t).
Proof: Assume t = 1, then n = (n) for any complete simple game with n voters.
There is only one complete simple game with veto M = (n), only one complete
simple game with passers M = (1), only one complete simple game with semi-
veto players M = (n − 1), and only one complete simple game with semi-passers
M = (2).
Thus, the pairwise bijections between pairs of sets CGV(n, 1), CGP(n, 1), CGSV(n, 1)
and CGSP(n, 1) are clear.
Assume from now on that t > 1. We define a bijection f from CGV(n, t) to
CGN (n, t); a bijection g from CGP(n, t) to CGN (n, t); a bijection h from CGV(n, t)
to CGSV(n, t) and a bijection k from CGP(n, t) to CGSP(n, t). Of course, any other
bijection is a composition of some of these bijections or their inverses.
(1) Definition of a bijection f between CGV(n, t) and CGN (n, t).
Let (n,M) ∈ CGV(n, t) be the characteristic invariants of a complete
simple game with t types of voters having a veto. Let n = (n1, n2, . . . , nt)
and mi,j be the components ofM as defined in Equation (2) with 1 ≤ i ≤ r
and 1 ≤ j ≤ t and m·,1 = n1 because the game has veto players.5
In order to define the bijection f , we distinguish two separate cases:
(i) The game has no null voters.
Then, f sends vector (n1, n2, n3, . . . , nt) to vector (n2, n3, . . . , nt, n1)
and matrixM to matrixM′ where for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r and 1 ≤ j ≤ t− 1
the elements of M′ are defined as m′i,j = mi,j+1, whereas m′·,t = 0.
That is,
(4) M′ =


m1,2 . . . m1,t 0
m2,2 . . . m2,t 0
...
. . .
...
...
mr,2 . . . mr,t 0


(ii) The game has null voters.
Then, f is the identity.
Now we need to check that:
(a) The map f is well–defined.
(b) The map f is injective.
(c) The map f is surjective.
Well-defined. We have to prove that f(n,M) ∈ CGN (n, t). This is trivially
true if (n,M) has null voters. Otherwise, let f(n,M) = (n′,M′) whereM′
is defined as in Equation (4), this pair fulfills the conditions established in
Theorem 9-(A), n′ has t components and m′·,t = 0 guarantees the presence
of null voters. Hence, (n′,M′) ∈ CGN (n, t).
5A dot in the first subindex m
·,j means that i is any value between 1 and r. Analogously, a
dot in the second subindex in mi,· means that j is any value between 1 and t.
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Injective. Let (n,M), (m,P) ∈ CGV(n, t) with f(n,M) = f(m,P). If
f(n,M) has null voters then (n,M) = f(n,M) = f(m,P) = (m,P).
Otherwise, let f(n,M) = f(m,P) = (h,Q), then
h = (h1, h2, . . . , ht−1, ht) = (n2, . . . , nt, n1) = (m2, . . . ,mt,m1),
thus nj = mj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ t and we have n = m; moreover
qi,j = mi,j+1 = pi,j+1 for all i, and for all j < t,
Thus M and P have the same dimensions and their components coincide,
with the possible exceptions of the components appearing in their respective
first columns, but (n,M), (m,P) ∈ CGV(n, t) guarantees that all of them
are equal to n1 and thereforeM = P .
Surjective. Let (m,P) ∈ CGN (n, t). If it has veto players then (m,P) ∈
CGV(n, t) and f(m,P) = (m,P). Otherwise, consider (n,M) defined as
follows:
n1 = mt, ni = mi−1 for 1 < i ≤ t,
m·,1 = mt, mi,j = pi,j−1 for 1 < j ≤ t.
The pair (n,M) fulfills the conditions of Theorem 9-(A) and has veto play-
ers, therefore (n,M) ∈ CGV(n, t); and f(n,M) = (m,P).
(2) Definition of a bijection g from CGP(n, t) to CGN (n, t).
Let (n,M) ∈ CGP(n, t) be the characteristic invariants of a complete
simple game with t types having passers. Let n = (n1, n2, . . . , nt) and mi,j
be the components of M as defined in Equation (3) with 1 ≤ i ≤ r and
1 ≤ j ≤ t and m1,1 = 1, m1,j = 0 if j > 1, mi,1 = 0 if i > 1 because the
game has passers.
In order to define the bijection g, we distinguish two separate cases:
(i) The game has no null voters.
Then, g sends vector (n1, n2, n3, . . . , nt) to vector (n2, n3, . . . , nt, n1)
and matrix M to matrix M′ with r − 1 rows, where for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r
and 1 ≤ j ≤ t− 1 the elements of M′ are defined as m′i,j = mi+1,j+1,
whereas m′·,t = 0. That is,
(5) M′ =


m2,2 . . . m2,t 0
m3,2 . . . m3,t 0
...
. . .
...
...
mr,2 . . . mr,t 0


(ii) The game has null voters.
Then, g is the identity.
Well-defined. All the rows ofM are not pairwise δ-comparable because they
fulfill the conditions in Theorem 9-(A), as the game has n1 vetoers, the first
common component n1 of all the rows has no effect on these comparisons.
Thus, the rows ofM′ are not pairwise δ-comparable and therefore the pair
(n′,M′) fulfills the conditions in Theorem 9-(A) and g turns the n1 vetoers
into n1 nulls. Therefore, (n,M′) ∈ CGN (n, t).
The proof that g is injective and exhaustive follows the same guidelines
as for f .
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(3) Definition of a bijection h from CGV(n, t) to CGSV(n, t).
Let (n,M) ∈ CGV(n, t) be the characteristic invariants of a complete
simple game with t types of voters having at least one veto player. Let n =
(n1, n2, . . . , nt) andmi,j be the components ofM as defined in Equation (2)
with 1 ≤ i ≤ r and 1 ≤ j ≤ t and m·,1 = n1 because the game has veto
players.
In order to define the bijection h, we distinguish two separate cases:
(i) The game has no semi-vetoers.
Then, h leaves invariant the vector (n1, . . . , nt) and adds a last row in
M which is (n1 − 1, n2, . . . , nt) getting M′, i.e. this addition converts
the n1 vetoers into n1 semi-vetoers since N \ {i} for all i ∈ N1 turns
into a winning coalition.
(ii) The game has semi-vetoers.
Then, h is the identity.
Well-defined. Each row ofM, which is also a row ofM′, dominates the new
last row of M′ because the first component of the former rows are equal
to n1 which is greater than n1 − 1. Moreover,
∑t
i=1mk,i < n − 1 for all
k = 1, . . . , r since
∑t
i=1mk,i = n− 1 would imply that coalition N \ {i} for
all i ∈ N1 would be winning in the original complete simple game (n,M),
which is a contradiction with the non-existence of semi-vetoers. Thus,
h(n,M) = (n,M′) fulfills the conditions of Theorem 9-(A) and h turns the
n1 vetoers into n1 semi-vetoers. Therefore, (n,M′) ∈ CGSV(n, t).
The proof that h is injective and exhaustive follows the same guidelines
as for f .
(4) Definition of a bijection k from CGP(n, t) to CGSP(n, t)
Let (n,M) ∈ CGP(n, t) be the characteristic invariants of a complete
game with passers and with t types of voters. Let n = (n1, . . . , nt) and
mi,j be the components of M as defined in Equation (3) with 1 ≤ i ≤ r
and 1 ≤ j ≤ t.
In order to define the bijection k, we distinguish two separate cases:
(i) The game has no semi-passers.
Then, k leaves invariant vector (n1, . . . , nt) and transform the first row
inM which is (1, 0, . . . , 0, 0) into (1, 0, . . . , 0, 1), while the rest of rows
keep invariant to get M′.
(ii) The game has semi-passers.
Then, k is the identity.
Well-defined. Of course the first new row of M′ dominates the other rows
because (1, 0, . . . , 0, 1) δ-dominates (1, 0, . . . , 0, 0) which δ-dominates the
rest of the rows ofM′. Conversely, as the game has no semi-passers it does
not have any row of type (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0, 1) and all of its rows δ-dominate
(0, 1, 0, . . . , 0, 1) and as mi,1 = 0 for all i > 1 it follows that each row
k = 2, . . . r of M does not δ-dominate (1, 0, . . . , 0, 1), thus they are pair-
wise non-δ-comparable. Thus, k(n,M) = (n,M′) fulfills the conditions of
Theorem 9-(A) and k turns the n1 passers into n1 semi-passers. Therefore,
(n,M′) ∈ CGSP(n, t).
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The proof that k is injective and exhaustive follows the same guidelines
as for f .

We remark that we had to exclude the set CGN (n) from the bijections in Theo-
rem 11 for t = 1 since there are no simple games with only null voters due to the
definition of a simple game.
Corollary 1. For all positive integers n and t we have
CGV (n, t) = CGP (n, t) = CGSV (n, t) = CGSP (n, t).
For t > 1 we additionally have CGN(n, t) = CGV (n, t) and CGN(n, 1) = CGV (n, 1)−
1 = 0.
Having the enumeration results for complete simple games with n voters and at
most 2 types of voters at hand, we can conclude enumeration formulas for complete
simple games with t < 4 types of voters, where at least one of these equivalence
classes corresponds to a distinguished type of voters. We state the results for
CGV (n, t) only. Combining them with Corollary 1 yields five simultaneous equiv-
alent enumerations.
Proposition 1.
(1) CGV (n, 1) = 1,
(2) CGV (n, 2) =
n(n− 1)
2
(whenever n ≥ 2),
(3) CGV (n, 3) = F (n+ 7)− 1
2
(n3 + 2n2 + 13n+ 26) (whenever n ≥ 4),
where F (n) are the Fibonacci numbers which form a sequence of integer
numbers defined by the following recurrence relation: F (0) = 0, F (1) = 1,
and F (n) = F (n− 1) + F (n− 2) for all n > 1.
Proof:
(1) If t = 1, both vector n and matrix M must coincide with the number of
voters n. Therefore CGV (n, 1) = 1.
(2) If t = 2, let n = (n1, n2) for a given game. As the game must have veto
players then all the entries in the first column must be n1. As the rows ofM
must be non-comparable by the δ-relation, thenM only should have a row
with the only requirement that m1,2 must be different from n2, otherwise
all players would be equivalent and therefore t = 1, which would be a
contradiction. Thus we have
CGV (n, 2) =
n−1∑
n1=1
=n2−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
n− n1 − 1∑
m1,2=0
1 =
n(n− 1)
2
.
(3) If we remove the null voters from a complete simple game with t types of
voters (having at least one null voter), we obtain a complete simple game
with t− 1 types of voters without null voters. We remark that due to the
definition of a simple game it cannot consist of null voters only. Thus we
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have
CGV (n, 3) =
n∑
i=1
CG(n− i, 2)−CGV (n− i, 2) =
n−2∑
i=1
CG(n− i, 2)−CGV (n− i, 2).
Inserting CGV (n, 2) =
n(n− 1)
2
and CG(n, 2) = F (n+6)− (n2 +4n+8),
see Equation 1, yields
CGV (n, 3) =
n−1∑
k=2
[
F (k + 6)− k(k − 1)
2
− (k2 + 4k + 8)
]
CGV (n, 3) = F (n+ 7)− 1
2
(n3 + 2n2 + 13n+ 26)

Starting with n = 4 the first ten numbers of the sequence CGV (n, 3) are:
2, 11, 37, 98, 225, 470, 919, 1713, 3082, 5400.
Asymptotically we have
lim
n→∞
CGV (n, 3)
CG(n, 2)
= lim
n→∞
F (n+ 7) +O(n3)
F (n+ 6) +O(n2)
= lim
n→∞
F (n+ 7)
F (n+ 6)
=
1 +
√
5
2
.
Thus, when n is fix and high enough, the number of complete games with three
types of voters having veto players (or semi-veto, passer, semi-passer or null voters)
is almost equal to the number of complete games with only two types of voters
multiplied by
1 +
√
5
2
.
We remark that the bijections from Theorem 11 respect the property of being
weighted, which is not too hard to prove but we omit this part because it is not
needed for the purposes of this paper. Moreover, the bijections keep games within
the class of so-called α-roughly weighted games, where the fraction of the weight
of the heaviest losing coalition divided by the weight of lightest winning coalition
is at most α ≥ 1, see [20], where the authors have introduced this as one of three
hierarchies in order to classify simple games. The special case α = 1 corresponds
to the better known class of roughly-weighted games, see e.g. [21].
4. Enumerations with two distinguished type of voters in a complete
simple game
Continuing the considerations from Section 3 we study complete simple games
containing at least two of the six distinguished types from Definition 5. As men-
tioned in the beginning of Section 3 each complete simple game with a dictator
contains n−1 null voters. By CGDN(n) we denote the number of complete simple
games with n voters containing a dictator and at least one null and by CGDN(n, t)
we denote the number of these objects additionally restricted to exactly t types of
voters. From Lemma 2 we conclude:
Lemma 3. For n ≥ 2 we have CGDN(n) = CGD(n) = 1 and
CGDN(n, t) = CGD(n, t) =
{
1 if t = 2,
0 otherwise.
For n ≤ 1 all four counts are zero.
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Each dictator has also a veto and is a passer. So for each subset S ⊆ {V, P} we
have CGDSN(n) = CGDS(n) and CGDSN(n, t) = CGDS(n, t), extending the
previously used notation for the number of complete simple games with presence
of some distinguished types of voters in a natural way.
If a complete simple game containing a dictator contains a semi-vetoer or a
semi-passer then we have n = 2 and t = 2.
Lemma 4. For two subsets S1 ⊆ {V, P,N} and S2 ⊆ {SV, SP} with |S2| ≥ 1 we
have
CGDS1S2(n) =
{
1 if n = 2,
0 otherwise
and CGDS1S2(n, t) =
{
1 if n = t = 2,
0 otherwise.
If a complete simple game contains a passer and a veto then these roles must be
taken by the same player, which then is a unique dictator, and for each subset S ⊆
{SV, SP,N} we have CGV PS(n) = CGDS(n) and CGV PS(n, t) = CGDS(n, t),
compare the enumeration formulas in Lemma 2, Lemma 3, and Lemma 4.
Next we consider the simultaneous occurrence of a semi-vetoer and a semi-passer
in a complete simple game. By CGSV SP (n) we denote the number of complete
simple games with n voters containing at least one semi-veto and at least one semi-
passer. By CGSV SP (n, t) we denote the number of these objects additionally
restricted to exactly t types of voters. Here, and in the following definitions, we
permit the somewhat artificial situation that the two types of distinguished voters
could be taken by the same player.
Lemma 5. For n ≥ 1 we have
CGSV SP (n) =


0 if n = 1,
2 if n = 3,
1 otherwise
and
CGSV SP (n, t) =


1 if t = 1, n = 3,
1 if t = 2, n ≥ 2,
0 otherwise.
Proof: We assume that voter 1 is a semi-passer. From the definition of a semi-
passer we conclude {1} /∈ W , {1, 2}, {1, 3}, . . . , {1, n} ∈ W . For n ≥ 4 voter 1 is
the unique voter being contained in each winning coalition besides N\{i}. Thus
voter 1 also has to be the unique semi-veto and we conclude
Wm =
{{1, 2}, {1, 3}, . . . , {1, n}, {2, 3, . . . , n}}.
Since this simple game has the weighted representation [n− 1;n− 2;
n−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, 1, . . . , 1] it
is complete. For n = 1 no simple game containing a semi-veto and a semi-passer
exists. If n = 2 and voter 1 is a semi-passer, then we have
{{1}} /∈ W and{{1, 2}} ∈ W . Since for each semi-veto player i the coalition N\{i} is winning, we
conclude that voter 1 is also a semi-veto player and
{{2}} is a winning coalition,
so that we have Wm =
{{2}}. Here player 2 is a dictator, in contrast to our
usual ordering of the players. We remark that player 1 is also a null voter and
thus has three roles in this example. For n = 3 we have the simple games uniquely
characterized by Wm =
{{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}} and Wm = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}}. In the
first example voter 1 is both the unique semi-passer and the unique semi-veto. In
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the second example all three players are semi-passers and semi-vetoers. In the third
example voter 1 is the unique semi-passer and players 2 and 3 are the semi-vetoers.
We remark that all simple games with at most three voters are complete (and
weighted). 
Next we consider complete simple games containing vetoers and semi-passers.
The corresponding counts are denoted by CGV SP (n) and CGV SP (n, t).
Lemma 6. For n ≥ 1 we have
CGV SP (n) =


0 if n = 1,
2 if n = 2,
1 otherwise
and CGV SP (n, t) =


1 if t = 1, n = 2,
1 if t = 2, n ≥ 2,
0 otherwise.
Proof: For n = 1 no semi-passer is possible and for n = 2 there are only three
complete simple games. So we can easily check that the complete simple game
given by Wm =
{{1}, {2}} does contain neither a vetoer nor a semi-passer. In
the complete simple game given by Wm =
{{1}} voter 1 has a veto and voter 2
is a semi-passer, so that we have t = 2. In the complete simple game given by
Wm =
{{1, 2}} both players are semi-passers and vetoers, so that we have t = 1.
For n ≥ 3 we assume that voter 1 is a semi-passer so that {1, 2}, {1, 3}, . . . , {1, n} ∈
W and {1} /∈W . The only possible veto player is voter 1 and no further vetoers or
semi-passers can be present. Thus voter 1 forms its own equivalence class of voters
N1. Since player 1 has a veto we conclude W
m =
{{1, 2}, {1, 3}, . . . , {1, n}} and
t = 2. 
Similarly we denote by CGPSV (n) and CGPSV (n, t) the counts for complete
simple games containing passers and semi-vetoers.
Lemma 7. For n ≥ 1 we have
CGPSV (n) =


0 if n = 1,
2 if n = 2,
1 otherwise
and CGPSV (n, t) =


1 if t = 1, n = 2,
1 if t = 2, n ≥ 2,
0 otherwise.
Proof: For n = 1 no semi-vetoer is possible and for n = 2 there are only three
complete simple games. Assuming w.l.o.g. that voter 1 is a passer the remaining
possibilities are given by Wm =
{{1}, {2}} and Wm = {{1}}. In the first men-
tioned complete simple game both players are passers and semi-vetoers so that we
have t = 1. In the second case voter 1 is a passer and voter 2 a semi-vetoer so that
we have t = 2.
Due to the definition of a semi-vetoer for n ≥ 3 the only possible semi-vetoer
is player 1 and there can be no other passers besides player 1. Thus we have
Wm =
{{1}, {2, . . . , n}}. 
Even more mapping to dual games is a bijection between the corresponding
classes of complete simple games of Lemma 6 and Lemma 7, since the pairs ve-
toers/passers and semi-vetoers/semi-passers are interchanged, see Definition 6 and
the comment thereafter.
Due to the definition of a semi-passer (for n ≥ 2) a complete simple game
cannot contain both a semi-passer and a null voter. Similarly a complete simple
game cannot contain both a semi-vetoer and a null voter.
The remaining pairs of distinguished types of voters are veto/semi-veto, passer/semi-
passer, veto/null, and passer/null. The respective counts are denoted by CGV SV (n),
CGPSP (n), CGV N(n), CGPN(n), CGV SV (n, t), CGPSP (n, t), CGV N(n, t),
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and CGPN(n, t). We denote the corresponding classes by CGVSV(n), CGPSP(n),
CGVN (n), CGPN (n), CGVSV(n, t), CGPSP(n, t), CGVN (n, t), and CGPN (n, t).
Theorem 12. For all positive integers n > 1 and t > 1 there is a bijection between
CGVSV(n, t), CGPSP(n, t), CGVN (n, t) and CGPN (n, t).
Proof: We first define a bijection h′ between CGVN (n, t) and CGPN (n, t) in the
following way; if (n,M) ∈ CGVN (n, t)
h′(n,M) = (n,M∗)
where (n,M∗) is the dual game of (n,M).
Now we need to check that:
(1) The map h′ is well–defined.
(2) The map h′ is injective.
(3) The map h′ is surjective.
Well-defined. We have to prove that h′(n,M) = (n,M∗) ∈ CGPN (n, t). This is
trivially true because the dual of a complete game is a complete game too, i ∈ N
is null in (N,W ) if and only if i ∈ N is null in (N,W ∗), and i ∈ N has veto in
(N,W ) if and only if i ∈ N is a passer in (N,W ∗).
Injective. Let (n,M), (m,P) ∈ CGVN (n, t) with h′(n,M) = h′(m,P). Let h′(n,M) =
h′(m,P) = (h,Q). Because of the definition of h′ we have:
h = n = m and Q =M∗ = P∗
and after applying duality to the last expression we obtain the desired equality, i.e.
Q∗ = (M∗)∗ =M and Q∗ = (P∗)∗ = P
Surjective. Let (m,P) ∈ CGPN (n, t), then it is clear that (m,P∗) ∈ CGVN (n, t)
and h′(m,P∗) = (m,P).
Next we remark that the same mapping is also a bijection from CGVSV(n, t) to
CGPSP(n, t). As before all three conditions can be easily checked.
Finaly we define a bijection h′′ between CGVSV(n, t) and CGVN (n, t) in the fol-
lowing way; if (n,M) ∈ CGVSV(n, t), with n = (n1, . . . , nt) andM = (mi,j)1≤i≤r,1≤j≤t,
then h′′(n,M) = (n′,M′), where
n′ = (n1, n3, . . . , nt, n2),
M′ =

 m1,1 m1,3 · · · m1,t 0... ... . . . ... ...
mr−1,1 mr−1,3 · · · mr−1,t 0

 .
We note that we have r ≥ 2. In other words, we have shifted the second equiva-
lence class of voters to the t-th equivalence class, while replacing the second column
(m1,2, . . . ,mr,2)
T by the all-zero vector and deleted the last row of M.
Due to Lemma 1.v) the second column and the last row of M are uniquely
characterized by the values of n1, . . . , nt. So it remains to check that the resulting
games are complete simple games with t equivalence classes of voters, i.e. that they
satisfy the conditions from Theorem 9, which can be done easily. 
Corollary 2. For all positive integers n > 1 and t > 1 we have
CGV SV (n, t) = CGPSP (n, t) = CGV N(n, t) = CGPN(n, t).
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Proposition 2.
(1) CGV N(n, 2) = n− 1 (whenever n ≥ 2),
(2) CGV N(n, 3) =
(n− 1)(n− 2)(n− 3)
6
(whenever n ≥ 4),
(3) CGV N(n, 4) = F (n+8)− 1
6
(n4−2n3+26n2+47n+132) (whenever n ≥ 5).
Proof:
(1) Assume t = 2, for each vector (n1, n2) with n1 + n2 = n with 0 < n1 < n
there is a unique matrix which is M = (n1, 0).
(2) Assume t = 3, for each vector (n1, n2, n3) there are n2− 1 matrices of type
M = (n1, a, 0) where 0 < a < n2. Hence,
CGV N(n, 3) = 1(n− 3) + 2(n− 4) + 3(n− 5) + · · ·+ (n− 3)1
which coincides with the given expression.
(3) If we remove the null voters from a complete simple game with t types of
voters (having at least one null voter), we obtain a complete simple game
with t−1 types of voters without null voters. Thus we have CGV N(n, 4) =
n∑
i=1
CGV (n− i, 3)− CGV N(n− i, 3) =
n−4∑
i=1
CGV (n− i, 3)− CGV N(n− i, 3).
Inserting the previously obtained results
CGV (n, 3) = F (n+ 7)− 1
2
(n3 + 2n2 + 13n+ 26)
CGV N(n, 3) =
(n− 1)(n− 2)(n− 3)
6
for n ≥ 5 yields CGV N(n, 4) =
n−1∑
k=4
[
F (k + 7)− 1
2
(k3 + 2k2 + 13k + 26)− 1
6
(k − 1)(k − 2)(k − 3)
]
= F (n+ 8)− 1
6
(n4 − 2n3 + 26n2 + 47n+ 132).

Starting with n = 5 the first ten numbers of the sequence CGV N(n, 4) are:
1, 8, 35, 113, 303, 717, 1552, 3145, 6062, 11242.
Asymptotically we have
lim
n→∞
CGV N(n, 4)
CG(n, 2)
= lim
n→∞
F (n+ 8) +O(n4)
F (n+ 6) +O(n2)
= lim
n→∞
F (n+ 8)
F (n+ 6)
=
(
1 +
√
5
2
)2
Thus, when n is fix and high enough, the number of complete games with four
types of voters having vetoers and nulls (or one of the combinations passers/nulls,
vetoers/semi-vetoers, or passers/semi-passer) is almost equal to the number of com-
plete games with two types of voters multiplied by
(
1 +
√
5
2
)2
.
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5. Enumerations with more than two distinguished type of voters in
a complete simple game
Continuing the considerations from the previous two sections we study com-
plete simple games containing at least three of the six distinguished types from
Definition 5. Complete simple games containing a dictator and at least another
distinguished type of voters are completely treated at the beginning of Section 4.
So in the following we assume that no dictator is present, including the combina-
tion of a passer and a vetoer, which then would be a dictator. Summarizing the
results from Section 4 we state that only the following seven combinations of two
distinguished type of voters are possible:
• semi-passer and semi-vetoer
• vetoer and semi-vetoer
• passer and semi-passer
• passer and semi-vetoer
• vetoer and semi-passer
• vetoer and null voter
• passer and null voter
If a complete simple game contains at least one semi-passer and at least one semi-
vetoer then no other distinguished types of voters can occur. If we represent the
possible combinations of two distinguished types of voters by an edge, we obtain
a quadrangle on the set {vetoer, passer, semi-vetoer, semi-passer} of vertices. Thus
there are no complete simple games with at least three distinguished types of voters.
6. Conclusion and future research
In this paper we have studied complete simple games containing at least one voter
of a list of distinguished types of voters and provided several bijections between
the corresponding classes of voting systems. This contributes to the program of
numerical characterization and classification of voting systems initiated by von
Neumann and Morgenstern [31].
It turned out that all of the countsCGV (n, 3), CGN(n, 3), CGP (n, 3), CGSV (n, 3),
CGSP (n, 3), CGV N(n, 4), CGPN(n, 4), CGPSP (n, 4), and CGV SV (n, 4) of com-
plete simple games with distinguished and two additional types of voters belong to
the class Θ
((
1 +
√
5
2
)n)
as well as CG(n, 2). Thus, the addition of just one
of the following set of voters: vetoers, passers, nulls, vetoers and nulls, passers or
nulls, semi-vetoers or semi-passers in a complete game with two types of voters does
not alter the asymptotic behavior. For a fix n the number of these games is equal
to k · F (n + 6) + P (n) where for each case k is a positive constant that takes one
of the two values
1 +
√
5
2
or
(
1 +
√
5
2
)2
, and P is a polynomial.
The exact enumeration formulas are mainly based on the previously determined
enumeration of complete simple games with two types of voters, i.e. CG(n, 2). A
quite natural next step now is to consider complete simple games with three types
of voters. So far we were only able to compute the first few exact values. For
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4 ≤ n ≤ 21 the sequence CSG(n, 3) is given by
6, 50, 262, 1114, 4278, 15769, 58147, 221089, 886411, 3806475, 17681979,
89337562, 492188528, 2959459154, 19424078142, 139141985438,
1087614361775, 9274721292503.
For t ≥ 4 and n ≥ 10 we could only compute the additional values CG(10, 4) =
4570902,CG(11, 4 = 59776637,CG(12, 4) = 1047858496,CG(13, 4) = 26000281487,
CG(10, 5) = 412734188, CG(11, 5) = 29086472429, and CG(10, 6) = 42427707348.
Significant sub-classes of the studied structures are those which are weighted
games and, or more generally, roughly weighted games being complete. Even though
that there exist combinatorial characterizations of weighted games (see [13] and [39])
and of roughly weighted games (see [21]), very little is known on closed enumeration
formulas for these much more restrictive voting structures, besides May’s Theorem
for voting systems with only one type of voters.
Using the characterization of weighted voting games with two types of voters
given in [14] we can at least compute some exact values of WG(n, 2) without gen-
erating the entire class of corresponding complete simple games with two types of
voters. We would like to remark that it took only 19 days of computation time
to compute the values of WG(n, 2) for all n ≤ 200. Two examples are given by
WG(100, 2) = 27970501 and WG(200, 2) = 851946591. Having these numerical
data at hand we observe that WG(n, 2) ≈ 0.002531n5 + O(n4). And indeed it is
not too hard to come up with an upper bound of WG(n, 2) ≤ n5
15
+ 4n4, see [11],
and a similar lower bound. The determination of an exact enumeration formula for
WG(n, 2) seems to be an interesting but resolvable research problem.
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